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Abstract: How can we approach the truth in a society? It may depend on various factors. In this paper, using a well-established truth
seeking model, we show that the persistent free information flow will bring us to the truth. Here the free information flow is modeled
as the environmental random noise that could alter one’s cognition. Without the random noise, the model predicts that the truth can
only be captured by the truth seekers who own active perceptive ability of the truth and their believers, while the other individuals
may stick to falsehood. But under the influence of the random noise, we strictly prove that even there is only one truth seeker in the
group, all individuals will finally approach the truth.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, opinion dynamics has become an emerg-
ing research hot and attracted more and more attention from
various areas, including the social science, mathematics, infor-
mation theory, and so on [1, 2]. The investigation methods of
opinion dynamics range from qualitative ways to quantitative
ways, and the latter one has become more and more important
in the rapidly developing information age. One of the main
tools for quantitatively investigating the evolution of opinions
is building the mathematical model to analyzing the behaviors
of the opinion evolution, and several agent-based mathemat-
ical models of opinion dynamics were proposed in the past
decades [3–8]. It is interesting that these models could ef-
fectively characterize the complexity of opinion behaviors in
plenty of situations and display various phenomena, such as
the basic agreement or disagreement of the opinions [7], and
the more complex autocratic or democratic social structures
[9].
Among the diverse issues concerned in the social dynam-
ics, an interesting topic is to investigate how we can approach
truth in a social opinion group [10, 11]. We want to know
what kind of factors could be beneficial for us to seek truth. In
[10], a truth seeking model was built based on the well-known
Hegselmann-Krause (HK) confidence-based opinion dynamics
(also see Section 2 in the current paper). In this model, vari-
ous factors are shown to be connected with the truth seeking
of the group, including the proportion of the truth seekers, the
attraction strength of the truth to truth seekers, the confidence
threshold of the individuals, and the position of the truth value
and the initial opinion values of all individuals. Nevertheless,
how these factors determine the truth seeking is intricate and
even counter-intuitive somehow. For example, intuitively, the
more truth seekers exist and the stronger the strength of the
truth attraction is, the more likely the group will approach the
truth if given other conditions unchanged. However, the situa-
tion is far more complex, since it can be shown that the more
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truth seekers and the larger attraction strength could make a
reachable truth unreachable.
Apart from the factors mentioned above, are there any other
remarkable factors that could affect the truth seeking? For the
social opinion dynamics, an inevitable influence factor is the
free information flow in the society, especially in this Internet
era. People’s opinions are affected not only by communicating
with the other individuals, but also by receiving the intensive
information from the free media, such as the newspapers, the
TV shows, the broadcast, and especially the information flow
through the social media nowadays. Usually this free infor-
mation flow can be modeled as persistent random noise added
to the opinion dynamics model. By simulating and analyz-
ing the noisy opinion models, it is interesting to find that the
random noise could play a positive role in enhancing the con-
sensus of opinions [13–16]. A strict theoretical analysis of this
fact was established very recently based on the HK model in
[17], where it is proved that when all the individuals were af-
fected by the random noises, the noisy HK model will almost
surely reach quasi-consensus (a consensus concept defined in
the noise case) if the noise strength is below a critical value,
while the noisy opinions almost surely diverge if the noise
strength exceeds the critical value. This fact reveals that the
free information could affect the social opinion evolution es-
sentially.
With the above exciting findings about the free information
flow, we also eager to know whether the free information flow
could benefit the truth seeking in a society. In this paper, using
the truth seeking model built in [10], we indeed find that the
free information flow will effectively help the individuals ac-
quire the truth. To be specific, we strictly prove that, under the
influence of the random noise whose strength is below a proper
value, the opinion values of all individuals will almost surely
approach the truth value and stay nearby, as long as there is
only one active truth seeker or more in the group. The effec-
tive noise strength is shown to only depend on the intrinsic
parameters of the group, i.e., the number of the truth seekers,
the size of the group, the attraction strength of the truth, and
the confidence threshold.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the truth seeking model with free information flow
and Section 3 gives the main analytical results of the paper.
Some numerical simulations are displayed in Section 4 to ver-
ify our main results, and Section 5 concludes the paper finally.
2 Preliminary and Formulation
2.1 Truth Seeking Model
The noise-free truth seeking model was established in [10]:
for i ∈ V ,
xi(t+ 1) = αiA+ (1− αi)
∑
j∈Ni(x(t))
xj(t)
|Ni(x(t))|
, (1)
Here, V = {1, . . . , n} is the group of agents, xi(t) ∈ [0, 1]
is opinion value of agent i at time t, ǫ is the common confi-
dence threshold, A ∈ [0, 1] is the truth value, αi ∈ [0, 1] is the
attraction strength of truth for agent i, and
Ni(x(t)) = {j ∈ V
∣∣ |xj(t)− xi(t)| ≤ ǫ} (2)
is the neighbor set of i at time t.
Denote S = {i ∈ V : 0 < αi ≤ 1} as the set of truth seek-
ers. When |S| = 0, i.e., there is no truth seeker in the group,
the model (1) degenerates to the classical Hegselmann-Krause
opinion dynamics [7], where opinion fragmentation may hap-
pen, let alone failing in seeking truth. When |S| = n, i.e.,
all the individuals are truth seekers, the truth is surely to be
achieved [10]. If 1 ≤ |S| < n, i.e., only part of agents are
truth seekers, the truth can approached by the truth seekers and
some of their neighbors, while the other individuals cannot ac-
quire the truth [10] (see Figure 1 for illustration).
2.2 Free Information Flow
In real situations, people’s attitudes or beliefs can also be in-
fluenced by the touched information, from the news, the broad-
cast, the TV shows, and even some rumors. This information
flow affects one’s opinion in a stochastic way. Hence, the truth
seeking model (1) should be added some random noises: for
t ≥ 0,
xi(t+ 1) =(1− αiI{i∈S})
∑
j∈Ni(x(t))
xj(t)
|Ni(x(t))|
+ αiI{i∈S}A+ ξi(t+ 1), i ∈ V ,
(3)
where I{i∈S} is the indicator function, which takes value 1 or
0, according to i ∈ S or not. {ξi(t)}i∈V,t>0 are the random
noises that model the free information flow and we simply as-
sume they are the independent random variables uniformly dis-
tributed on [−δ, δ] with δ > 0.
On account of the extreme opinions in reality, in our model
settings in the following, we suppose the noisy opinion val-
ues are still limited in a closed interval, say [0, 1] without loss
of generality. Also, in our analysis, we only consider the ho-
mogenous attraction strength, i.e., αi = α ∈ (0, 1], i ∈ V ,
then
xi(t+1) =


1, x∗i (t) > 1
x∗i (t), x
∗
i (t) ∈ [0, 1]
0, x∗i (t) < 0
, ∀i ∈ V , t ≥ 0, (4)
where
x∗i (t) =(1− αI{i∈S})
∑
j∈Ni(x(t))
xj(t)
|Ni(x(t))|
+ αI{i∈S}A+ ξi(t+ 1).
(5)
and
1 ≤ |S| ≤ n,
{ξi(t), i ∈ V , t > 0} are independent and uniformly
distributed on [−δ, δ].
(6)
2.3 Approach Truth
For the truth seeking model (1), the system can be said to
acquire the truth A if lim
t→∞
xi(t) = A, i ∈ V . However, with
the presence of random noise, which could fluctuate the opin-
ions with the amplitude of the noise strength, we should give
a definition for the system (4)-(6) to achieve the truth approxi-
mately:
Definition 1. Denote dAV (t) = max
i∈V
|xi(t) − A|, then we
say the system (4)-(6) approach the truth with φ-precision, if
lim sup
t→∞
dAV (t) ≤ φ a.s. holds.
3 Main Results
As Figure 1 shows, it is also easy to check that, as long as
not all the individuals are truth seekers in the group, there al-
ways exist initial conditions that the system cannot achieve the
truth. In this part, we will show that, with the free informa-
tion flow, the system could approach the truth given any initial
conditions.
Letm = |S| and denote
δ1 =
n(1− α)δ
mα
+ δ, δ2 =
nδ
mα
+ δ, δ¯ = max{δ1, δ2},
δ = min{
mα
2n+ (2m− n)α
ǫ,
m
n+ 2m
ǫ}
(7)
then for system (4)-(6), we have the following main result:
Theorem 1. Let 0 < α < 1 in the model (4)-(6), then for any
initial state x(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, ǫ ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, δ], the system
will a.s. approach the truth with δ¯-precision.
Remark 1. The truth seeking of the model (1) is related to the
“intrinsic parameters”, i.e., ǫ, α, n,m, of the system, however,
this relationship is quite intricate as pointed out in Section 1.
With the free information flow, Theorem 1 indicates that the
system will approach the truth and the effective noise strength
is also determined by the intrinsic parameters. However, the
relationship between the parameters and the truth seeking re-
sult, δ¯ and δ, is much intuitive. Roughly, the larger m and α
the system possesses, the larger the effective noise strength δ
is allowed, and the better the precision δ¯ is obtained for given
δ.
The following Corollary provides a special case of Theorem
1 for a better demonstration:
Corollary 1. Suppose m = ⌈n/2⌉, α = 0.5, then a.s.
lim sup
t→∞
dAV (t) ≤ 5δ for all δ ∈ (0, ǫ/8].
Now we turn to the proof of Theorem 1, and some prelimi-
nary lemmas are needed.
Lemma 1. [12] Suppose {zi, i = 1, 2, . . .} is a nondecreasing
(nonincreasing) real sequence. Then for any integer s ≥ 0, the
sequence {gs(k) =
1
k
∑s+k
i=s+1 zi, k ≥ 1} is monotonically
nondecreasing (nonincreasing) with respect to k.
Lemma 2. For 0 < α ≤ 1, if there is finite time T such
that dAS (T ) ≤ δ1, d
A
S¯
(T ) ≤ δ2(S¯ = V − S), then a.s.
lim sup
t→∞
dAS (T ) ≤ δ1, lim sup
t→∞
dA
S¯
(T ) ≤ δ2 on {T < ∞} for
0 < δ ≤ δ.
Proof. At time T , we have a.s.
max
i,j∈V
|xi(T )− xj(T )|
≤max
i∈V
|xi(T )−A|+max
j∈V
|xj(T )−A|
≤δ1 + δ2 ≤ ǫ.
(8)
This means all agents are neighbors to each other at step T ,
implying |Ni(x(T ))| = n, i ∈ V . Hence by (4) and (5),
xi(T + 1) =αA + (1− α)
∑
k∈V xk(T )
n
+ ξi(T + 1),
i ∈ S,
xj(T + 1) =
∑
k∈V xk(T )
n
+ ξj(T + 1), j ∈ S¯.
(9)
Then a.s.
|xi(T + 1)−A|
=
∣∣∣∣αA−A+
∑
k∈V xk(T )
n
+ ξi(T + 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤
1− α
n
∑
k∈V
|A− xk(T )|+ δ
≤(1 − α)
mδ1 + (n−m)δ2
n
δ + δ ≤ δ1, i ∈ S.
(10)
and a.s.
|xj(T + 1)−A|
=
∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈V xk(T )
n
−A+ ξi(T + 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤
1
n
∑
k∈V
|A− xk(T )|+ δ
≤
mδ1 + (n−m)δ2
n
δ + δ ≤ δ2, j ∈ S¯.
(11)
This means
dAS (T + 1) ≤ δ1, d
A
S¯ (T + 1) ≤ δ2.
Repeating the above procedure, we will obtain the conclusion.
Now we give the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1: It is easy to know that for all i ∈ V , t ≥ 1,
P{ξi(t) ∈ [δ/2, δ]} = P{ξi(t) ∈ [−δ,−δ/2]} =
1
4
. (12)
Denote x˜i(t) = |N (i, x(t))|
−1
∑
j∈N (i,x(t)) xj(t), t ≥ 0,
and this denotation remains valid for the rest of the con-
text. If dAV (0) ≤ δ, the conclusion holds by Lemma 2 since
δ1 ≥ δ, δ2 ≥ δ. Otherwise, consider the following protocol:
for all i ∈ V , t > 0,
{
ξi(t+ 1) ∈ [δ/2, δ], if x˜i(t) ≤ A;
ξi(t+ 1) ∈ [−δ,−δ/2], if x˜i(t) > A.
(13)
By Lemma 1, (4) and (5), we know under the protocol (13) that
dAV (1) ≤ max
i∈V
{|x˜i(0)−A| − δ/2}
≤ max
i∈V
{|xi(0)−A| − δ/2}
≤ dAV (0)− δ/2.
By (12) and independence,
P{dAV (1) ≤ d
A
V (0)− δ/2} ≥
1
4n
. (14)
Let L = 1−δδ/2 , if d
A
V (1) ≤ δ, the conclusion holds. Otherwise,
continue the above procedure L times and we can get by (14)
and independence that
P{dAV (L) ≤ δ} ≥
1
4nL
> 0. (15)
Thus
P{dAV (L) > δ} ≤ 1−
1
4nL
. (16)
Denote events
E0 = Ω,
Em = {ω : d
A
V (t) > δ, (m− 1)L < t ≤ mL},m ≥ 1.
(17)
Since x(0) is arbitrarily given, by (16), we can get form ≥ 1
that
P{Em|Em−1} ≤ P{d
A
V (mL) > δ|Em−1}
≤ 1−
1
4nL
< 1.
(18)
Note by Lemma 2 that {lim sup
t→∞
dAV (t) > δ¯} ⊂{ ⋂
m≥1
{dAV (t) > δ, (m − 1)L < t ≤ mL}
}
, then by
(18)
P{lim sup
t→∞
dAV (t) ≤ δ¯}
=1− P{lim sup
t→∞
dAV (t) > δ¯}
≥1− P
{ ⋂
m≥1
{dAV (t) > δ, (m− 1)L < t ≤ mL}
}
=1− P
{ ⋂
m≥1
Em
}
=1− P
{
lim
m→∞
m⋂
j=1
Ej
}
= 1− lim
m→∞
P
{ m⋂
j=1
Ej
}
=1− lim
m→∞
m∏
j=1
P{Ej|Ej−1}
≥1− lim
m→∞
(
1−
1
4nL
)m
= 1.
This complete the proof. ✷
4 Simulations
In this part, we will present some simulations to demon-
strate the truth seeking with the influence of the free informa-
tion flow. Let n = 20, xi(0), i ∈ V are randomly generated
from the interval [0, 1], ǫ = 0.2, A = 0.8, α = 0.5,m = 10.
Figure 1 shows the case of truth seeking when there is no free
information flow. It can be seen that only part of the indi-
viduals achieve the truth. Next we show the case when there
is free information flow. Take the same intrinsic parameters
as in Figure 1. According to Corollary 1, when the noise
strength 0 < δ ≤ ǫ/8, the system will approach the truth.
Take δ = 0.02, then Figures 2, 3 show the result.
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Fig. 1: The truth seeking of the model (1). Take n=20, m=10,
α = 0.5, confidence threshold ǫ = 0.2.
5 Conclusions
How the free information flow influence the truth seeking in
a society is of interest to the investigation of social dynamics.
In this paper, we use a well-established truth seeking model
and strictly prove that the free information flow could effec-
tively enable the approach of the truth in a group. This in-
teresting discovery could provide us inspiration to investigate
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Fig. 2: The truth seeking of the model (4)-(6). Take the same
parameters and add random noise with strength δ = 0.02 here.
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Fig. 3: Figure 2 is re-plotted to better display the initial picture
of evolution.
how the free information flow determines the evolution of the
social dynamics under other topics.
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